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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.   
In order to remove a lawsuit filed in state court to a 
federal district court under the federal removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446, a defendant must file a notice of 
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removal within thirty days of the date on which the 
plaintiff serves “the defendant.”  Courts have split in 
interpreting this thirty day limitation:  the Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits have held that the thirty day period ends 
thirty days after the first defendant is served (the “first-
served” rule), and the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh 
Circuits have held that each defendant has a thirty day 
period to file a notice of removal that ends thirty days 
after that defendant is served (the “later-served” rule).  
Nicole M. Delalla and NMD Marketing, Inc. appeal in 
part from the District Court‟s order denying a motion to 
remand on the basis that removal was proper under the 
later-served rule.  Because we conclude that the later-
served rule represents the most faithful and equitable 
reading of the removal statute, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s order. 
I 
 In 2004, Delalla and NMD were sued by Product 
Partners, LLC in a trademark dispute over a line of 
nutritional supplements sold under the name “Slim 90.”  
See Product Partners, LLC v. NMD Marketing Inc., No. 
04-CV-1775 (E.D. Pa. filed Apr. 23, 2004).  At the time, 
NMD held a liability insurance policy issued by Hanover 
Insurance.  Hanover retained Joseph Oberlies of Connor 
Weber & Oberlies to represent both Delalla and NMD.  
Oberlies negotiated a settlement under which Delalla and 
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NMD agreed to discontinue the sales and marketing of 
products under the “Slim 90” name.   
 Although Delalla and NMD complied with the 
terms of the settlement, they did not feel that the 
negotiated settlement was truly in their interest.  Delalla 
and NMD privately retained counsel and requested that 
Oberlies explain why the settlement was in their interests.   
 Unsatisfied with Oberlies‟ response, on March 30, 
2009 Delalla and NMD filed suit against Hanover, 
Oberlies, and Connor Weber & Oberlies in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Camden County, alleging legal 
malpractice and other related claims under New Jersey 
law.  On April 14, 2009, Delalla and NMD served 
Hanover with the Complaint.  Oberlies and his law firm 
(collectively, the “Law Firm Defendants”), however, 
were not served until April 23, 2009.   
 On May 15, 2009, more than thirty days after 
Hanover was served but less than thirty days after the 
Law Firm Defendants were served, the Law Firm 
Defendants filed a notice of removal.  Although Hanover 
had not filed a notice of removal within thirty days of 
being served, it joined in the Law Firm Defendants‟ 
notice of removal.  The case was removed to the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, and 
was assigned to Judge Robert B. Kugler. 
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 On May 22, 2009, Delalla and NMD filed a 
motion to remand the action to New Jersey state court on 
the basis that the notice of removal was not timely, 
having been filed more than thirty days after Hanover 
was served.  On October 16, 2009, Judge Kugler denied 
the motion to remand, finding that the removal was 
timely under the later-served rule.   
 On February 24, 2010, Judge Kugler granted the 
Law Firm Defendants‟ motion to transfer the case to the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  The case was assigned to Judge Michael 
M. Baylson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.   
 On May 24, 2010, Judge Baylson held oral 
argument on various dispositive motions that had been 
filed while the case was pending in the District of New 
Jersey.  On May 26, 2010, Judge Baylson denied the 
motions without prejudice, and ordered Delalla and 
NMD to file within thirty days an Amended Complaint 
that satisfied Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).  
Delalla and NMD did not comply with Judge Baylson‟s 
order; instead, on July 2, 2010, they moved for Judge 
Baylson to recuse himself from the case.   
 On August 17, 2010, Judge Baylson denied the 
motion for recusal, and ordered that Delalla and NMD 
show cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed 
for failure to comply with Rule 9(b).  Delalla and NMD 
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responded, but on September 23, 2010, Judge Baylson 
dismissed the case with prejudice.  On September 28, 
2010, Delalla and NMD filed a timely notice of appeal 
from Judge Baylson‟s September 23, 2010 Order “and 
from all previous orders in the case.”  On February 28, 
2011, along with their brief, Delalla and NMD filed a 
separate petition for mandamus relating to Judge 
Kugler‟s February 24, 2010 Order transferring the case. 
II 
The District Courts had removal jurisdiction over 
this action based on diversity of citizenship under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(a).
1
  Delalla and NMD appeal in 
part from Judge Kugler‟s October 16, 2009 Order 
denying their motion to remand.
2
  Delalla and NMD urge 
                                                 
1
 Although Delalla and NMD take issue with whether 
removal was timely, the timeliness of a notice of removal 
does not affect whether removal jurisdiction exists under 28 
U.S.C. § 1441.  See Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 114 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he failure to file a removal petition within 
the 30 day statutory time limit [does not] affect this Court‟s 
jurisdiction.” (quoting McGlinchey v. Hartford Accident & 
Indem. Co., 866 F.2d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 1989))). 
2
 Delalla and NMD also appeal: (1) Judge Kugler‟s February 
24, 2010 Order transferring the case; (2) Judge Baylson‟s 
August 17, 2010 Order denying Delalla and NMD‟s motion 
for recusal; and (3) Judge Baylson‟s September 23, 2010 
Order dismissing the case.   
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An order transferring venue is not appealable until 
final judgment is entered, unless either the district court 
certifies an appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), or the party 
seeking to challenge the order files a petition for mandamus.  
See Nascone v. Spudnuts, Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 765-66 (3d Cir. 
1984).  Final judgment was entered on September 23, 2010, 
when Judge Baylson dismissed Delalla and NMD‟s 
complaint.  Curiously, rather than immediately appealing 
from that final judgment, Delalla and NMD have filed a 
petition for mandamus along with this appeal.  See In re 
Nicole M. Delalla, No. 11-1532 (3d Cir. filed Mar. 3, 2011).  
We have jurisdiction over this petition pursuant to the All 
Writs Act.  28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).   
Mandamus petitions are subject to a stringent standard 
of review—in order to grant mandamus relief, “an appellate 
court must find a clear legal error calling for relief that can be 
obtained through no other means.”  Gold v. Johns-Manville 
Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068, 1074 (3d Cir. 1983) (emphasis 
added).  When Delalla and NMD filed their notice of appeal, 
final judgment had already been entered.  They could and 
should have appealed the transfer order as part of their appeal.  
See Nascone, 735 F.2d at 766 (“[I]f the plaintiff ultimately 
could appeal from an adverse final judgment in the case, we 
believe the plaintiff could then raise the failure of the district 
court to re-transfer as grounds for reversal.”).  Because 
Delalla and NMD could have obtained relief through 
alternative means, mandamus relief is not warranted.  Id. 
Even if final judgment had not been entered, nothing in the 
record suggests that Judge Kugler erred in transferring the 
case and Delalla and NMD‟s petition would fail on the merits. 
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us to reverse Judge Kugler‟s order denying their motion 
to remand, arguing that the Law Firm Defendants‟ notice 
of removal was untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).  We 
have final order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Because this appeal requires us to interpret § 1446(b), we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s order.  
See Lieberman v. Cambridge Partners, LLC, 432 F.3d 
482, 486 (3d Cir. 2005) (exercising plenary review over 
questions of statutory interpretation). 
To resolve this appeal, we must weigh in on a 
question that has become the subject of a deep circuit 
split:  “Does the first-served defendant‟s thirty-day clock 
run for all subsequently served defendants (the first-
served rule), or does each defendant get his own thirty 
days to remove after being served (the later-served 
                                                                                                             
We similarly conclude that Judge Baylson did not 
abuse his discretion by denying the motion to recuse.  
Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 1987).  
Nothing in the record, when considered objectively, 
“display[s] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would 
make fair judgment impossible.”  In re Westinghouse Secs. 
Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 720 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States 
v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d Cir. 1994)).  
Finally, we agree that Delalla and NMD‟s Complaint 
fails to satisfy Rule 9(b), for substantially the same reasons 
set forth in Judge Baylson‟s August 17, 2010 Memorandum.  
Mem., Aug. 17, 2010, ECF No. 19. 
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rule)?”  Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 
2011).  We have yet to address this issue in a 
precedential opinion.  For the reasons that follow, we join 
the majority of circuits and adopt the later-served rule. 
A 
 “Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”  
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 
375, 377 (1994).  “Within constitutional bounds, 
Congress decides what cases the federal courts have 
jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides 
whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also 
determine when, and under what conditions, federal 
courts can hear them.”  Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 
212-13 (2007).   
By statute, “any civil action brought in a State 
court of which the district courts of the United States 
have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the 
defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the 
United States for the district and division embracing the 
place where such action is pending.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1441(a).  The procedure for removal is set out in 28 
U.S.C. § 1446.  Section 1446(a) provides that any 
defendant wishing to remove a case must file a notice of 
removal in federal court: 
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A defendant or defendants desiring to 
remove any civil action or criminal 
prosecution from a State court shall file in 
the district court of the United States for the 
district and division within which such 
action is pending a notice of removal . . . 
containing a short and plain statement of the 
grounds for removal, together with a copy of 
all process, pleadings, and orders served 
upon such defendant or defendants in such 
action. 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).  Section 1446(b) then sets out the 
rules governing each notice of removal, including the 
thirty day limitation at issue here: 
The notice of removal of a civil action or 
proceeding shall be filed within thirty days 
after the receipt by the defendant, through 
service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 
pleading setting forth the claim for relief 
upon which such action or proceeding is 
based, or within thirty days after the service 
of summons upon the defendant if such 
initial pleading has then been filed in court 
and is not required to be served on the 
defendant, whichever period is shorter. 
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 
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 In construing the thirty day limitation, the majority 
of courts of appeals have adopted what has been called 
the later-served defendant rule—the rule applied by the 
District Court.  Under the later-served rule, each 
defendant individually has thirty days to file a notice of 
removal beginning when that particular defendant is 
served.  See Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Bailey v. Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 
1209 (11th Cir. 2008); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z-Teca 
Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir. 2001); Brierly v. 
Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., 184 F.3d 527, 533 
(6th Cir. 1999).   
 On the other side of the split are the Fourth and 
Fifth Circuits, which have adopted variations of what has 
been called the first-served defendant rule.  Under the 
first-served rule, in order to successfully remove a state 
court case, any defendant that seeks to file a notice of 
removal must do so within thirty days of the date of 
service for the first-served defendant.
3
  See Barbour v. 
                                                 
3
 The Fourth Circuit distinguishes its rule from the Fifth 
Circuit‟s rule, calling its approach the “McKinney 
Intermediate Rule.” Barbour, 640 F.3d at 607.  Both Circuits, 
however, agree that no defendant may file a notice of removal 
more than thirty days after the first defendant is served.  The 
distinction between the two rules concerns whether the same 
thirty day window applies to later-served defendants who 
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Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 610 (4th Cir. 2011); Getty Oil 
Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262-63 (5th 
Cir. 1988).    
We agree with the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits that the later-served rule represents the 
best reading of § 1446(b) “for reasons grounded in 
statutory construction, equity and common sense.”  
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956. 
B 
 “When interpreting a statute . . . we must turn first 
to the language of the statute itself.  When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the 
last:  judicial inquiry is complete.”  SimmsParris v. 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., -- F.3d --, No. 09-4542, 2011 
WL 3196079, at *3 (3d Cir. July 28, 2011) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)).   
Section 1446(a) provides that “[a] defendant or 
defendants” may initiate the removal process by filing a 
notice of removal.  By referring to “defendants” in the 
plural, this subsection explicitly anticipates the 
possibility that multiple defendants will file notices of 
removal.  Section 1446(b) then sets out the rules 
                                                                                                             
wish to join in another defendant‟s timely notice of 
removal—a distinction not relevant to this appeal.   
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governing each notice of removal that may eventually be 
filed, providing that “[t]he notice of removal of a civil 
action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after 
the receipt by the defendant . . . .”  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 
Section 1446(a) sets out the general rule that 
defendants in a civil action must file a notice of removal 
in order to initiate the removal process.  Section 1446(b) 
then sets out a specific rule governing the timeliness of 
each notice of removal that is eventually filed.  See 
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 955; Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207; 
Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533; see also Barbour, 640 F.3d at 
622 (Agee, J., concurring in judgment).  This reading 
follows from the text of the two provisions, which must 
be read together in order to give effect to congressional 
intent regarding the procedure for removal.  Kokoszka v. 
Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (statutes should be 
read as a whole in order to properly construe 
congressional intent).   
Subsection (a) uses the phrase “defendant or 
defendants” to indicate that one or more defendants may 
attempt to remove a case by filing a notice of removal.  
Subsection (b) then uses the singular to refer to “[t]he 
notice of removal” and “the defendant [who has been 
served].”  Given that § 1446(a) explicitly affirms the 
possibility of multiple notices of removal, the only 
reasonable reading of § 1446(b) is that the subsection 
applies individually to each notice of removal that might 
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potentially be filed by each removing “defendant.”  To 
hold otherwise would create tension between subsections 
(a) and (b).  The plain text of § 1446(b) thus points 
toward the later-served rule. 
Textual reasons alone support the adoption of the 
later-served rule.  It is worth noting, nonetheless, that the 
rule is also more equitable than the first-served rule.  
Under the later-served rule, each defendant has an equal 
amount of time in which to decide whether or not to file a 
notice of removal.  As a result, a defendant‟s right to 
removal is protected without regard to when that 
defendant was served.  Under the first-served rule, on the 
other hand, the time a defendant has to file a notice of 
removal is a function of when that defendant is served.  
Consequently, a later-served defendant may be denied his 
or her right to file a notice of removal and to convince his 
or her more reluctant co-defendants to join in removal 
merely because the removing defendant was not served 
earlier.  In fact, under the first-served rule, the possibility 
exists that a later-served defendant would have had to file 
a notice of removal before being served with a complaint.  
Such a result contravenes Congress‟s “intent to eliminate 
the situation wherein a defendant who has not received 
the complaint must decide whether to remove „before he 
knows what the suit is about.‟”  Sikirica v. Nationwide 
Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 214, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
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Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 
U.S. 344, 352 (1999)). 
The first-served rule not only unfairly prejudices 
later-served defendants, but it creates a perverse 
incentive system that encourages further inequity.  Under 
the first-served rule, a plaintiff who wishes to remain in 
state court benefits by serving a defendant who is 
indifferent to removal, and then waiting to serve other 
defendants who are more likely to wish to remove.  The 
rule thus incentivizes plaintiffs to take advantage of the 
inequities inherent under the first-served rule.  By 
protecting each defendant‟s right to removal without 
regard to whether other defendants were served earlier, 
the later-served rule thus removes the incentive for 
“unfair manipulation by delaying service on defendants 
most likely to remove.”  Destfino, 630 F.3d at 955.   
C 
 Courts that have adopted the first-served rule offer 
three reasons for their decisions:  (1) the first-served rule 
derives from a better reading of the language of § 
1446(b); (2) the later-served rule is inequitable because it 
allows earlier-served defendants two opportunities to 
remove; and (3) the first-served rule is more appropriate 
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given that removal statutes are to be strictly construed.
4
  
None of these arguments upends the textual basis for the 
later-served rule, nor its equitable justifications. 
  Courts of appeals adhering to the first-served rule 
proffer a different reading of § 1446(b), noting that the 
thirty day window only applies to the first-served 
defendant because the statute uses the singular when 
referring to “the defendant.”  See, e.g., Barbour, 640 F.3d 
at 611.  The use of the singular, these courts argue, 
suggests that Congress intended that the thirty day period 
run only once, rather than for each removing defendant. 
When considering the plain meaning of a statute, 
however, a court should “not look merely to a particular 
clause in which general words may be used, but will take 
in connection with it the whole statute . . . and give to it 
                                                 
4
 One court has also suggested that the later-served rule is 
unfair to plaintiffs because it exposes them to the possibility 
that at some point later in the litigation, they may have to 
move to federal court.  Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 
482 (5th Cir. 1986).  As has been pointed out, any such 
unfairness would be the product of a plaintiff‟s decision to 
delay service upon a defendant after serving the first-served 
defendant.  Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956.  Even if the delay could 
not be fairly attributed to the plaintiff, “the marginal 
efficiency benefits of selecting a forum early don‟t outweigh 
the manifest unfairness of depriving later-served defendants 
of a federal forum.”  Id. 
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such a construction as will carry into execution the will 
of the Legislature.”  Kokoszka, 417 U.S. at 650 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 
60 U.S. 183, 194 (1856)).  It is certainly true that 
subsection (b) uses the singular in referring to “the 
defendant.” Subsection (b) also uses the singular in the 
same clause when discussing “the notice of removal.”  If 
the use of the singular with respect to “the defendant” 
required that thirty day period only applied to one 
singular defendant, the use of the singular with respect to 
“the notice of removal” should similarly require that only 
one notice of removal be permissible.  As already 
discussed, however, such a reading would conflict with § 
1446(a), which explicitly anticipates the possibility of 
multiple notices of removal.   
In fact, as other courts have recognized, the Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits‟ textual reading contravenes the actual 
language of § 1446(b) by substituting “the defendant” 
with “the initial defendant.” Destfino, 630 F.3d at 955; 
Barbour, 640 F.3d at 622-23 (Agee, J., concurring in 
judgment).  Moreover, if Congress had intended to create 
a first-served rule, it could easily have stated as much in 
§ 1446(b).  It did not.  By reading the text to support the 
first-served rule, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have failed 
to read § 1446(b) alongside § 1446(a) in order to 
properly construe the congressional intent behind the 
statute as a whole.  The later-served rule thus arises out 
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of the most sensible reading of the plain language of § 
1446. 
In addition to this textual argument, first-served 
circuits have also argued that the later-served rule is 
inappropriate because it allows earlier-served defendants 
two opportunities to exercise their right to removal.  
Once thirty days have passed after the first defendant is 
served, these circuits argue, the first-served defendant has 
chosen not to exercise its right to removal.  Removal 
requires unanimity—all defendants must join in a notice 
of removal in order for removal to be permissible.  See 
Fletcher v. Hamlet, 116 U.S. 408, 410 (1886) (“There 
can be no removal by the defendants unless they all join  
. . . .”).  Because the first-served defendant, at the close 
of the initial thirty day period, has chosen to not exercise 
his or her right to removal, there can no longer be 
unanimity.  The last-served rule, first-served Circuits 
argue, accommodates the rule of unanimity by allowing 
earlier-served defendants to “change their minds” and 
choose to join in a notice of removal even after initially 
deciding against removal.  The later-served rule thus 
supposedly allows earlier-served defendants two bites at 
the removal apple.  
As other courts have pointed out, this argument 
equates filing a notice of removal with choosing not to 
join in a co-defendant‟s notice of removal.  As the Ninth 
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Circuit has recognized, however, the two actions are 
quite different: 
[T]he fact that a defendant hasn‟t taken the 
initiative to seek removal doesn‟t 
necessarily mean he will object when 
another defendant does.  Failure to file a 
petition may be based on a lack of resources, 
trusting a lawyer‟s advice or inertia.  There 
is no reason to lock an earlier-served 
defendant out of the federal forum, if he 
later chooses to consent. 
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956; see also Barbour, 640 F.3d at 
624 (Agee, J., concurring in judgment) (“[F]iling a notice 
of removal is not the same as joining in that removal.” 
(emphasis in original)).   
We agree with the Ninth Circuit.  Section 1446(b) 
plainly speaks to the requirements for filing a notice of 
removal; it does not speak to joinder in another 
defendant‟s notice of removal.  See Barbour, 640 F.3d at 
622-24 (Agee, J., concurring in judgment) (“Section 
1446(b) does not speak to multiple defendants, nor does 
it reference joinder.  Consequently, . . . [r]emoval is 
controlled by § 1446(b)‟s thirty-day requirement, but 
joinder is not.”).  That a defendant has chosen not to file 
a notice does not mean that the defendant has chosen to 
not join in another notice of removal.  An earlier-served 
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defendant should not be precluded from joining in 
another defendant‟s notice simply because that defendant 
elected not to file a notice of removal.  Neither the rule of 
unanimity nor § 1446(b) requires a different result. 
 Finally, courts that have adopted the first-served 
rule consistently cite to the general rule that statutory 
procedures for removal are to be strictly construed.  See, 
e.g., Barbour, 640 F.3d at 605 (citing Shamrock Oil & 
Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941)).  
Because the first-served rule represents the strictest 
reading of § 1446(b), these courts argue, it is the more 
appropriate approach.  While it is certainly true that 
removal statutes generally should be construed strictly, 
the Supreme Court has declined to adopt the strictest 
construction of a removal statute where the language of 
the statute and congressional intent point toward a more 
lenient interpretation.  Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti 
Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999).  In 
Murphy Bros., when presented with three alternative 
interpretations of the thirty-day window in § 1446(b), the 
Supreme Court chose a lenient reading of the statute 
based on its assessment of congressional intent.  See 
Destfino, 630 F.3d at 956.  In the wake of Murphy Bros., 
the general rule that removal statutes are to be construed 
strictly is not sufficient to displace the plain meaning of § 
1446(b), not to mention the fairness concerns that weigh 
in favor of the later-served rule.  See Destfino, 630 F.3d 
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at 956; Bailey, 536 F.3d at 1207; cf. Sikirica, 416 F.3d at 
222 (noting that this court‟s § 1446(b) jurisprudence “has 
been placed in doubt by Murphy Bros.”). 
IV 
We conclude that the later-served rule represents a 
better reading of the language § 1446(b) and results in 
more equitable treatment to later-served defendants.  We 
join the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in 
adopting the later-served rule.  We will therefore affirm the 
District Court‟s order. 
  
